### Some shell

A. Interpretation: all debaters’ substantive offense must be linked back through their framework. To clarify, debaters may not read a prioris, and debaters may not read arguments that say that property rights are inherently nonsensical which means they should be banned.

Spirit of the interp

B. Violation: conceded in CX that the Rose card functions independently of his offense

C. Standards

1. Reciprocity. Each a priori functions as a little NIB-even if I beat them back, I still have to prove obligation coming out of the AC framework—but I have to answer all of them because they are all game over issues if I even mishandle one of them. Kills fairness because you have an infinity to one advantage over me.

2. Clash. A prioris disincentivize clash because the best strategy using them is to just read as many as possible, hope I mishandle one, then extend it and win on face, which destroys education because you never have to clash with the arguments of the NC so we lose 7 minutes of education—also proves an unfair temporal skew because I lose all of my time. You can do it too isn’t responsive because the NC has to react to the aff and I’ve proven an education deficit.

D. Voters. Fairness is a voter- debate’s a competitive activity so you can’t assess the better debater if the round’s skewed. Educations a voter- it’s why schools fund debate and provides portable skills for the real world.

Drop the debater: 1. Substance is permanently skewed, I’ve had to invest time and alter 1N strategy to check abuse which shouldn’t have occurred in the first place so going back to substance skews my strategy. 2. Deterrence-a loss discourages them from engaging in future unfair practices for fear of losing the round.

Competing interps since 1. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom where we read increasingly unfair practices that minimally fit the brightline. Competing interps maximizes fairness and education by fostering good norms for the activity. 2. Reasonability collapses to competing interps-you use an offense-defense paradigm to determine reasonability being good which concedes the authority of competing interps-also means your arguments are infinitely regressive since saying reasonability is reasonable is circular.

No RVIs: 1. Illogical- being fair doesn’t mean you should win- otherwise both debaters would win without theory, which would be irresolvable- comes first since every debate needs a winner.

### Another shell

A. Interpretation: if debaters read substantive offense that isn’t linked back through their framework, it may not be read in a block of text in a framework warrant. It must be delineated in the contention.

## case

### presumption

**Substantive Warrants**

Presume neg. A. Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false. B. “Resolved” means “firmly determined to do something” so without a proactive reason to affirm, we wouldn’t be firmly determined and the resolution would be false. C. There’s inherent resource cost and uncertainty in passing a plan, so absent offense the status quo is better. D. When policy-makers can’t come to a conclusion, they don’t pass the bill. They shelve it for later debate. Substantive presumption arguments come first-A. theoretical presumption only kicks in if there’s zero offense left in the round, but my arguments show that there’s still a degree of negative offense. B. no warrant for why your theory warrants justify presumption specifically. We could also compensate by giving you some other theoretical advantages.

### A2 nardin

1. Straying from your constitutive aims simply creates a new form of activity-there is no reason to achieve the original constitutive aim of debate.

Enoch David Enoch “Shmagency Revisited” JW

But one may want to reject this initial claim, even with regard to chess. For it may be suggested that playing chess does after all suffice for having a reason – some reason, at least, perhaps a weak one, perhaps one that is outweighed by others – for checkmating your opponent. Perhaps there is no need after all for another reason, namely, a reason to be playing chess (or perhaps to play this specific game of chess)? If so, we may proceed to conclude that our merely playing the agency-game suffices for us having a reason to aim at its constitutive aims. As a general thesis, though, this cannot be true. We can define many cooked-up variations of chess, with slightly different rules, or perhaps slightly different ways of winning (say, you only win if you checkmate your opponent in an even number of moves; or when she still has her queen; or when she looks away; or cases in which you win if you move your castle diagonally three times when your opponent looks away; etc.). Whenever you find yourself playing chess, you also find yourself (in sufficiently early stages of the game) playing these cooked-up games chess\*, chess\*\*, chess\*\*\*, and so on. But it doesn't seem you have reasons to win at chess\*, or at chess\*\*, or at chess\*\*\*. This is so, presumably, because you don't have a reason to play chess\*, or chess\*\*, or chess\*\*\*. So this little example suffices to show that it's not in general true that engaging in some activity – satisfying some relevant descriptive criteria – suffices for having reason to aim at its constitutive aim. So if you think that the game of agency is different – if you think, in other words, that playing it suffices for having a reason to play it well, or to achieve its constitutive aims, or some such – then you must be able to come up with an answer to the question: What's so special about agency? Why is this true of agency, even though it's not true in general? I can’t think of an answer to this question (except perhaps in terms of inescapability, to which we will return shortly).

2. The difference between debate and other competitive activities is discussion. In soccer, you can’t kick a ball and create arguments for why something should change, but in debate you can do the thing you’re supposed to do, argue, and make arguments for why the content of the rules should be different. This means that rules are not defined by any standards since the overarching constitutive standard is argumentation-rules are open to interpretation so evaluate the pragmatic benefits of each worldview.

### Thompson Spikes O/V

I should be able to respond to spikes in the 2NR after you’ve extended them.

Premises have conditional strength-given different conditions the merits of the spike will change.

Thompson Marshall Thompson (coach for Harrison HS) “Miscellaneous Thoughts from the Disorganized Mind of Marshall Thompson” NSD Update April 21st 2015 <http://nsdupdate.com/2015/04/21/miscellaneous-thoughts-from-the-disorganized-mind-of-marshall-thompson/> JW

First, you can only assess an argument by knowing the way it is used. Because different uses of the same premise, will give the argument more or less credence. If I have a set of premises that entail a conclusion, those premises may cause me to accept the conclusion. However, I could also, given how much I doubt the conclusion give up on the premises. Thus for instance, if I started with the premise ‘I am not dreaming right now’ (which I do not think I am) that would lead me to think ‘I really am on a bus going to the airport.’ However, if that premise lead me to think ‘that really is my prize watermelon yodeling over the Swiss Alps, I would instead have reason to rethink my premise (perhaps I am dreaming after all). (Incidentally this is one of several reasons why the idea of a ‘skep trigger’ does not make sense. Just because my premise was strong enough to be part of an argument that your moral theory is false, does not mean it is strong enough to be part of an argument that no moral theory is true). . Now, before someone applies a spike, the strength of the conclusion is not there. Will the RVI apply to I-meets or only counter interpretations? Will the 1AR do something abusive that I will want to read theory against? Does prefer aff offense mean ‘always prefer’ or just ‘give it some higher credence’? Will no Neg RVIs suddenly apply to even if they read 3 new shells in the 1AR? The spike may seem reasonable in the context of the AC, but unreasonable in the context of the 1AR. A good example is a round I saw this last weekend. The affirmative read a spike that basically said the negative can only have one layer of offense (like only substance or only theory). The negative missed it and read theory and an NC. The aff extends it, but then also goes heavily for ‘reasonability’ against the negative theory. Now, by the ‘reasonability threshold’ the 1AR read it was clear that the spike was ‘unreasonable.’ I feel we should all agree that the negative should be allowed to argue that in the context of reasonability in the 1AR the spike should not be applied, however it strikes me that if all spikes are first ‘applied’ in the 1AR and thus the context of the 1AR should be provided to answer the argument. Therefore, given that one cannot assess the ‘conclusion’ of the spike, because the conclusion assumes the context of the 1AR, there it is unreasonable to expect the negative to try to answer the argument.

### turns

#### T- mandatory frameworks inhibit a sense of responsibility for other members of society

Mansell, Samuel. Proximity and Rationalisation: Reflections on the Limits of a Levinasian Ethics in the context of Corporate Governance. https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/management/documents/research/research-units/cppe/conference-pdfs/levinas/mansell.pdf

The more flexible a set of rules can be, such as the voluntary codes and principles used by business, the more chance will exist for aligning these **r**ules with a sense of responsibility for the Other. This requirement for flexibility is explained by Levinas’s argument that our responsibility for the Other can never be set along one fixed dimension. So, paradoxically perhaps, whilst the sort of ethical codes used by business can serve as an escape from real responsibility, they can at the same time (through their flexible and voluntary nature) offer the possibility for a degree of alignment with responsibility that a mandatory framework cannot capture. Directors have, under the UK Combined Code of 2003 (which I mention only as an example) the choice to comply with the principles in the code, or explain why they have deviated from them. Likewise, an employee who is supposedly subject to the ‘ethical code’ of the business will almost always have room for a flexible interpretation of what this means in any given context, and be able to apply what Aristotle (1980) calls ‘practical wisdom’. There is a chance that in the space left open by this flexibility, principles can be adhered to that do reflect a genuine openness of responsibility.

This outweighs – a. ability to recognize responsibility for others is an individual obligation, not the state’s since the community exists between individuals. B. it’s intrinsic to the maxim of the aff - there’s no room to choice whether or not to carry handguns – your intention arguments are solely about mindset, which is contingent, and not an intention since it’s a question of what is a part of the structure of a given maxim. C. Longevity – it establishes a culture of responsibility that does not have to be enforced by the state.

#### T- Our obligations to others within an ethical community can not be coerced

Duquette, David A. (St. Norbert College) Hegel: Social and Political Thought. [www.iep.utm.edu/hegelsoc/](http://www.iep.utm.edu/hegelsoc/) NP 3/6/16.

Only through the political constitution of the State can universality and particularity be welded together into a real unity. The self-consciousness of this unity is expressed in the recognition on the part of each citizen that the full meaning of one's actual freedom is found in the objective laws and institutions provided by the State. The aspect of identity comes to the fore in the recognition that individual citizens give to the ethical laws such that they "do not live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing these they will the universal in the light of the universal, and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end" (¶ 260). The aspect of differentiation, on the other hand, is found in "the right of individuals to their particular satisfaction," the right of subjective freedom which is maintained in Civil Society. Thus, according to Hegel, "the universal must be furthered, but subjectivity on the other hand must attain its full and living development. It is only when both these moments subsist in their strength that the state can be regarded as articulated and genuinely organized" (¶ 260, addition). As was indicated in the introduction to the concept of Ethical Life above, the higher authority of the laws and institutions of society requires a doctrine of duties. From the vantage point of the political State, this means that there must be a correlation between rights and duties. "In the state, as something ethical, as the inter-penetration of the substantive and the particular, my obligation to what is substantive is at the same time the embodiment of my particular freedom. This means that in the state duty and right are united in one and the same relation" (¶ 261). In fulfilling one's duties one is also satisfying particular interests, and the conviction that this is so Hegel calls "political sentiment" (politische Gesinnung) or patriotism. "This sentiment is, in general, trust (which may pass over into a greater or lesser degree of educated insight), or the consciousness that my interest, both substantive and particular, is contained and preserved in another's (that is, the state's) interest and end, i.e., in the other's relation to me as an individual" (¶ 268). Thus, the "bond of duty" cannot involve being coerced into obeying the laws of the State. "Commonplace thinking often has the impression that force holds the state together, but in fact its only bond is the sense of order which everybody possesses" (¶ 268, addition).

# 2NR

Counter interp: debaters may read [two/three/four] theory shells, deny the RVI, and not weigh between their shells.. I meet. Prefer:

1. Stratskew. if I can only indict one abusive practice then you can just read a prepped counter interp and go for other bad things. Outweighs since you can literally do whatever you want which kills fairness and education since all bad practices are permitted. No RVI is key since otherwise you can just load up a prepped out 4 minute counter interp and slam me on the theory debate since you have better prep, also key since if I come to the realization that I’m wrong in the middle of the round I should be allowed to concede the shell so I don’t have to argue for bad practices.

2. 1AR theory solves your abuse story and is better for your strategy: A. you don’t have to cover substance, a great 1AR would read mult shells, an aff specific RVI, and then cover my interps-that’s definitely do-able in a four minute 1AR since you can embed weighing, B. 2AR gets to collapse into one shell, whichever I undercover the most, and do amazing weighing and comparison for 3 minutes-better for your strat since I don’t have a 3NR to respond. C. you get access to meta theory so you can easily uplayer the neg to get a strategic advantage. D. better for your time-you can concede the voter section that I read and moot large portions of the 1NC. This is a turn to your interp since your interp does *not* allow multiple 1AR theory shells that are no risk and gain actual offense.